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Author(s): Clark McPhail and Ronald T. Wohlstein
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INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIORS WITHIN GATHERINGS, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND RIOTS

Clark McPhail

Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois 61801

Ronald T. Wohlstein

Department of Sociology, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois 61920

Abstract

The life cycles of gatherings, demonstrations, and riots begin with an assembling phase and end with a dispersal phase. The three types of events are primarily distinguished by the form and content of individual and collective behaviors that occur in the interim phase when a number of people are in the same locale at the same time. We review the past 15 years' research on behaviors in this phase. We first consider some elementary forms of collective behavior that frequently occur in all gatherings, demonstrations, and riots. We next examine more complex dimensions and forms of behavior within political, religious, and sport demonstrations. We then review research on the individual and aggregate violence against person, property, and property rights that distinguishes riots. Finally, we note some recurring patterns in the research on all three types of events, and we identify problems warranting further investigation.

INTRODUCTION

In the last 15 years, considerable attention has been given to certain common phases in the life cycle of gatherings, demonstrations, and riots. First, macro
scholars have addressed questions about the origins or occurrence of gatherings (e.g. W. F. Whyte 1943; W. H. Whyte 1980), of demonstrations (e.g. Blau & Slaughter 1971; Eisinger 1973; Tilly et al 1975; Morris 1981), and riots (e.g. Lieberson & Silverman 1965; Spilerman 1970; Snyder 1979). Micro scholars have addressed complementary questions of how individuals come to participate in gatherings (e.g. Bailey & McPhail 1979), demonstrations (e.g. Heirich 1971; McPhail & Miller 1973) and riots (e.g. Singer 1967; McPhail 1971; Moinat et al 1972). Second, macro scholars have been concerned with variations in the complexity or severity of gatherings, demonstrations, and riots, whereas micro scholars have focused on various individual and collective behaviors within those events and on interaction among the various participants. Third, macro scholars have been concerned with the consequences of demonstrations and riots for society (e.g. Turner 1969; Gamson 1975; Burstein & Freudenberg 1978; Mueller 1978; Kelly & Snyder, 1980) and micro scholars with the consequences for individual participants (e.g. Johnson 1971; Adamek & Lewis 1973; Mann 1974a; Cialdini et al 1976).

Scope
Given that sociologists have often examined and reported on the origins and consequences of gatherings, demonstrations, and riots, we present here our review of research on individual and collective behaviors within such events. We do not assume that what happens within events is independent of their origins or of how individuals have come to participate in them, just as we realize that a full assessment of what occurs within events cannot be made without attention to their conclusions and consequences. Finally, we do not review or critically evaluate the new or revised theoretical models appearing within the last 15 years. Such an evaluation presupposes familiarity with the range of behaviors those theories purport to explain. We hope this review provides a first step.

Some Working Definitions
The traditional term “crowd” frequently conveys an “illusion of unanimity” (Turner & Killian 1972). Instead, we use the term gathering to refer to two or more persons present at one time in a public place—e.g. on sidewalks, streetcorners, and plazas, as well as at scenes of fire, accident, and arrest. Gatherings are not synonymous with collective behavior but provide circumstances in which it may occur. People in gatherings engage in a variety of individual behaviors and may also, occasionally, engage in what we term collective behavior—i.e. two or more persons engaged in one or more behaviors (e.g. orientation, locomotion, gesticulation, tactile manipulation, and/
or vocalization) that can be judged common or convergent on one or more dimensions (e.g. direction, velocity, tempo, and/or substantive content).²

The term demonstrations here refers to gatherings consisting primarily though not exclusively of individual and/or collective behaviors of protest or celebration. We review research on political demonstrations, religious rallies, and sports events. Despite obvious differences in these three types of events, we believe more is gained than lost by examining their similarities.

The term riots here refers to gatherings or demonstrations consisting primarily but not exclusively of individual and/or collective violence against person or property. Demonstrations presuppose gatherings, and riots presuppose gatherings or demonstrations. Hence the order of our review.

BEHAVIORS WITHIN GATHERINGS

A decade ago several investigators (Berk 1972a; Fisher 1972; McPhail 1972) called for research on behaviors within gatherings. Since that time, though perhaps not in response to those calls, considerable attention has been given this problem. A number of scholars (Turner & Killian 1972; Wright 1978; McPhail & Pickens 1981) suggest that mutually inclusive collective behavior on the part of all members of a gathering is extremely rare, and that it is both simple and short-lived when it occurs. Instead, there is ongoing alternation between individual and collective behaviors within and by small clusters or sections of the larger gathering. Some of the simplest or elementary forms of collective behavior, therefore, involve: individual and collective pedestrian movements as well as conversation clusters within the milling phase of gatherings; the common or convergent direction of focus by clusters or contiguous clusters in a gathering; the collective locomotion of clusters toward or away from the common direction (or object) they are facing; the common direction of facing and locomotion within queues; and the common tempo and/or substantive content of collective vocalizations—chanting, singing, cheering, moaning, laughing. All involve two or more persons behaving collectively.

Milling

The distribution of clusters (a cluster comprises two or more persons touching and/or conversing) has been mapped in the United States (James 1953; Bake- man & Beck 1973; W. H. Whyte 1980), Sweden (Gehl 1968), Australia (Cioleck 1976), Japan (W. H. Whyte 1980), and in the Middle East (Berkowitz 1971). A consistent inverse relationship is reported between the size of clusters in public places and the frequency with which they are observed.

²A discussion of the limitations of other definitions and the comparative advantages of this definition of collective behavior is presented in McPhail (1984) and Wohlstein & McPhail (1979).

Ball-Rokeach (1973) reports a promising paradigm for investigating several features of “defining the situation” as discussed by Turner & Killian (1972). Variations in this paradigm could examine other factors that can contribute to the definition of the situation in milling gatherings—e.g. prior group structure (Short 1974), ongoing inter-group conflicts (Brymer 1969), and the modeling effects of police behaviors on majority group members confronting minority group members (Berk 1972b).

**Common Focus**

Milling gatherings and pedestrian movements are occasionally broken by fragments of common focus—i.e. by two or more persons orienting or facing in a common or convergent direction. Milgram, Bickman & Berkowitz (1969) produced common focus among New York City pedestrians by increasing the size of a stimulus cluster. Knowles & Bassett (1976) increased the number of passerby who faced in the same direction as a stimulus cluster by increasing the number of common behaviors in which they engaged.

**Collective Locomotion**

Once common focus is established, two or more people may move toward (or away from) that focus. This elementary form of collective behavior is integral to the development of “ring crowds” (Milgram & Toch 1969), the convergence upon police vehicles or upon speakers arriving at a rally (Wright 1978), or confrontations with rival group members (Berk 1972b; Brymer 1969). Mann (1970, 1977) examined a related phenomenon by varying the size of stimulus queues to induce commuters to move to the “correct” location at bus stops and to join the stimulus queue. He reports (1977) that stimulus clusters were effective only above a threshold of six members. Similarly, pedestrians awaiting the “walk” signal to commence locomotion in the direction of a common focus (the other side of the street) do violate the “don’t walk” signal, but...
significant increases above the baseline have been produced by the introduction of models (Lefkowitz et al 1955; Dannick 1973). An increase in the number of violating models increases the proportion of naive pedestrian violators, regardless of sex and race of model(s) or pedestrians (Russell et al 1976; \( V = .48 \), our secondary analysis).

**Queueing**

One of the commonest forms of elementary collective behavior is the queue. Leon Mann contends it is “the most ordered and cooperative . . . [and] the most highly structured” form. He describes a variety of queue forms (1973) and documents the presence and function of a “queue culture” (1969; cf. Mann & Taylor 1969; Konecni & Ebbesen 1976).

**Collective Vocalization**

Levy & Fenley (1979) examined the relationship between audience size (range: 125–976) and laughter at 15 preselected scenes during different showings of the movie *M.A.S.H.* in the same theatre. The larger the audience, the greater the mean level of laughter: \( r = .97 \). The correlation between scene sequence and mean extent of laughter per scene for all size audiences was \( r = .43 \). This increasing laughter throughout the film supports Allport’s (1924) “social facilitation” interpretation.

Pennebaker’s (1980) investigation of coughing behavior, another form of audience vocalization, elaborates this interpretation. The more people in the room, the greater the number of coughs heard, the greater attention given to one’s own coughing impulse (i.e. “throat tickle”), and the more likely one will cough. This “mindful” (vs the traditional “mindless imitation”) interpretation of modeling and suggestion may apply to a wide range of empirical relationships reported between modeled behavior and observers’ performance of the behavior (cf. Phillips 1979, 1982).

**Civilian Social Control**

From the behavior of people in pedestrian thoroughfares and intersections (Collett & Marsh 1974), plazas, lobbies, parks, and other public places (Goffman 1963; W. H. Whyte 1980), there is abundant evidence that human beings, individually, interpersonally, and collectively, organize and control their own behaviors in copresence. Research on density and crowding (Freedman 1975; Baldassare 1978; Choldin 1978) establishes the predominance of routine and orderly over pathological and disorderly behaviors in a variety of settings.

**Police Control**

Of two dozen riots examined by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner 1968), 50% of the final incidents preceding the riot involved
routine police-civilian encounters that began nonviolently but escalated into violence. Such encounters were the subsequent focus of considerable research. Reiss (1971) analyzed observer reports of 5000 encounters in Boston, Washington, and Chicago. Both parties were “civil” to one another in 83% of the encounters. In the remainder, police were more often the source than the recipients of incivility; but violence occurred in less than 1% of all the encounters.

Sykes (1977; Sykes & Brent 1980) analyzed 5000 additional encounters. Police typically control civilians by giving what we term “instructions for response”—i.e. by defining the situation, assigning designations to civilians, and/or by prescribing or proscribing civilians’ behaviors. Police controlled 95% of all encounters (4750 of 5000) by merely designating, prescribing, and proscribing. Where initial instructions did not suffice, repetition controlled 75% of the additional encounters. In the few remaining encounters (1% of 5000), police threatened or used coercion to overcome civilian resistance (usually associated with the presence of civilian bystanders).

Vandall (1973) examined police training and operations manuals of several major US city police departments and national and federal police agencies. None adequately told officers what they should look for and what they should do when confronting routine street gatherings.

BEHAVIORS WITHIN DEMONSTRATIONS

Political Demonstrations

Demonstrators, demonstration targets, spectators, media representatives, the police, and sometimes counter-demonstrators are present at demonstrations. This diversity of interests virtually guarantees ongoing variation in individual and collective behaviors within and between the categories of participants.

Modifying Sharp (1973), demonstrations can be divided into those involving advocacy or protest (e.g. rallies), advocacy or protest plus noncooperation (e.g. strikes), and advocacy or protest plus intervention (e.g. terrorism). More research has been done on advocacy or protest demonstrations than on the other two. A full range of noncooperative demonstrations is discussed in Sharp (1973). Jenkins and colleagues (1977, 1982) report on violent forms of collective intervention—e.g. skyjackings and kidnappings. Stern (1975) provides an insider’s account of the planning, rehearsals, and implementation of violent street actions. Marighella (1970) has written instructions for a variety of individual and collective acts of violent intervention. Alinsky’s (1972) statement remains the classic set of instructions and meta-instructions for legal and nonviolent forms of intervention (see assessments by Bailey 1972; Reitzes & Reitzes 1982).
SIZE AND DENSITY  Estimates of size have traditionally depended on the source (e.g. organizers, opponents, police) interviewed by reporters (Jacobs 1967) or the editorial bias of the local paper (Mann 1974b). Jacobs developed procedures for estimating areal variation in density (square footage per demonstrator). Jacobs’s procedure was refined by Major James Lindsey, Commissioner of Inspection for the US Federal Park Police (interviewed by McPhail, 1981) to estimate demonstration size in Washington DC. The Jacobs-Lindsey procedures have been used by working journalists (Currie 1979) to correct vastly inflated estimates offered by organizers and supporters.

ADVOCACY OR PROTEST  Advocacy or protest of some principle, actor, or action is common to all political demonstrations. This can include the intentional or unwitting influence of models on the behaviors of passersby and uncommitted participants. Although the use of sympathetic shils has traditionally been associated with carnival or sidewalk “pitchmen” (Boles 1972), there is ample historical evidence that politicians from Lincoln to Reagan (cf. Bruno & Greenfield, 1972) have planted supporters in their rallies. Hecklers may be planted by opposition groups to produce countereffects (Nandi 1980). Agents provocateurs are often planted in political rallies to advocate or model behaviors desired by the police (Marx 1974).

Hylton (1971) reports evidence that planting advocates in an audience can significantly affect its reaction. Hocking and colleagues (1977) present evidence that claqueurs in nightclubs can significantly increase both the amount of time audiences remain at performances and their evaluations of performers. Shils-as-models have also been used to increase the probability that passersby will sign political petitions (Blake, Mouton & Hain 1956; Helson, Blake & Mouton 1958). Shils provide instructions for response to the naive onlooker by patronizing the behavior proposed by a speaker or petitioner. Enthusiastic participants unwittingly play the same role. Just as their common focus of attention may attract passersby (cf. Milgram & Toch 1969; Knowles & Bassett 1976), so the activities of antiwar demonstrations are associated with more passersby stopping, answering interviewer questions, signing antiwar petitions, and accepting and wearing free antiwar buttons than occurred in the same location on days when no demonstration was taking place (Berkowitz 1974).

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION  Sociologists have increasingly demonstrated the social-network and organization bases for the occurrence of and participation in demonstrations (e.g. McCarthy & Zald 1973; Morris 1981). There is increasing evidence for the social organization of behaviors within demonstrations (e.g. Wright 1978). MacCannell (1973) reports evidence of prior planning and/or situational organization of participant behaviors in 92% of 126 protest demon-
strations examined. Burden (1967) provides a detailed account of the organization and extensive rehearsals for the performance of complex marching, singing, flag drills, and other collective behaviors at the 1927–1938 Nuremberg rallies. More recently, Lofland (1982a) provides an insightful analysis of the social organization of “crowd lobbying” at the California state capitol. Lofland & Fink (1982) report a similar examination of “symbolic sit-ins” in the midst of high-ranking state officials. Finally, McPhail & Wohlstein (1979) report both extensive field observations and a series of experimental studies of the microsocial organization of collective locomotion in the form of street actions, marches, and processions.

SOCIAL INTERACTION  MacCannell’s (1973) precedent-setting study of more than 100 US protest demonstrations reports that protest targets are encountered by demonstrators 60% of the time (cf. Eisinger’s 1973 report of 58%); bystanders are present in 94%, police in 89%, media in 54%, and organized counter-demonstrators in 36% of the demonstrations. MacCannell focused on participants’ (or observers’) reports of more than 145 behaviors by various categories of demonstration participants.

Kritzer (1977) used MacCannell’s data to test a nonrecursive causal model of protest-demonstration violence. He concluded that “exogenous variables [were] found to have little predictive power” and that “the outbreak of violence [in 38% of the] protest demonstrations [was] the result of a dynamic process resulting from the interaction of police and protestors.”

Most demonstrations are not violent. Eisinger (1973) reports no violence in 94% of the demonstrations in his (1968) sample of large US cities. Gamson (1975) reports no violence in 68% of the encounters among protest groups, targets, and police in his sample of US protest groups (c. 1800–1945). What forms of interaction between demonstrators and police become violent? Except for the MacCannell (1973) and Kritzer (1977) research, no systematic descriptions exist of the types of demonstrator behaviors that are typically followed by police intervention, or of the type of extent of intervention that is followed by demonstrators’ cooperation or resistance. The Tillys’ (1975) extensive examination of newspaper accounts of collective violence in France, Germany, and Italy between 1830 and 1930 illustrates Tilly’s (1978) contention that “most collective violence grows out of actions which are not intrinsically violent”—i.e. “strategic interaction” between contending groups. One group makes a claim for some right, resource, or redress of grievance that another group resists or refuses. They struggle. Violence results from resistance offered to the other’s forceful press of its claim.

SOCIAL CONTROL  It is surprising there have not been more accounts of, or manuals for training, deploying and coordinating demonstration marshals (cf.
GATHERINGS, DEMONSTRATIONS & RIOTS


Examination of police training manuals (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation 1967; Applegate 1969) suggests the traditional responses of US police to civilian resistance has been to use "progressive escalation of force" to overcome that resistance (cf. the response of Japanese police reported by Thornton 1971; Bayley 1976). Given the superiority of police weaponry, it is no surprise that uncontrolled police force escalates into "police riots" (Walker 1968; Stark 1972). Repeated documentation of police rioting (e.g., ACLU-SC 1967; Nelson & Bass 1969; Marx 1970; Davies 1973) evoked public criticism and some revisions in police policies and practices.

Following the police riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, considerable training and operations efforts were made by the Metropolitan, US Federal Park, and US Capitol Police agencies in Washington DC to achieve an orderly and lawful counterdemonstration at the Nixon inauguration (Sahid 1969). Similar efforts were apparent in the Chicago Police Department's response to the 1969 Days of Rage demonstrations staged by Weatherman (C. McPhail, field notes). Sterling (1973) reports extensive preparations and coordination involved in policing demonstrations at the 1972 Democratic and Republican national conventions (cf. Erickson & Flynn 1982 on policing at the 1976 Republican convention). Ahern (1972) reports the policies and procedures developed by the community police department he headed in conjunction with neighboring community police departments, state police, and state militia to monitor, contain, and control massive demonstrations on a university campus. There have also been some revisions in the policies stated in successive editions of Department of the Army manuals (cf. 1958, 1972a,b, 1975) for the control of demonstrations. Finally, social scientists have given some attention to the cooperative control of demonstrations by civilian and police participants (cf. Shellow & Roemer 1969; Mann & Iscoe 1971).

Religious Rallies

SIZE OF RALLY The relationship between size of audience and number of individuals making "decisions for Christ" was first examined in England by Argyle (1958). The more people in the audience, the greater the proportion of seekers complying with the call. Newton & Mann (1980) report the same relationship for 57 rallies in Australia. They report a "reliable positive relationship between crowd size and proportion [making] a decision for Christ" and also suggest that many of the persons responding to Billy Graham's call are religious counselors (cf. Wimberly et al 1975).

ADVOCACY AND MODELING Altheide & Johnson (1977) document the training of counselors and their deployment to assigned seats in strategic arena
locations with instructions to respond in staggered time-sequence to the invitation to “come forward to Christ.” Wimberly and colleagues (1975) report that the majority of persons do not move forward alone but in the company of at least one other person.

The Langs (1960) report the “loss” of an observer who abandoned her post and moved forward in response to Graham’s invitation to “make a decision for Christ.” Johnson (1971) examined this “religious transformation hypothesis” in an ingenious field experiment during a subsequent Graham rally. Forty-six undergraduates constituted an “actives treatment group” instructed to “freely participate in the singing, praying and whatever Graham asks you to do.” Another 46 constituted a “passives treatment group” instructed to “refrain from involvement in the singing, prayers and in the decision making at the close of the meeting.” A control group of 46 did not attend. Measures of religious beliefs, practices, and self-concept were taken of all three groups prior to, immediately after, and three weeks after the rally. Actives were more likely than passives to go forward at the end of the meeting (V = .70), to engage in audience singing (V = .49), and to participate in prayer (V = .46; all coefficients from our secondary analysis). No significant changes occurred across time in the religious beliefs, practices, or self-concepts of the active, passive, or control subjects, including those who went forward to “make a decision” at the rally’s end.

EMOTION Proudfoot & Shaver (1975) examined the chanting of the Nichiren Shoshu; they noted the physiological arousal that derives and the supernatural interpretation placed on that arousal. This analysis closely parallels Lofland’s (1977, 1982b) and Taylor’s (1978) analyses of the weekend “conversion camps” staged by “Worldsavers” and Moonies. Novice recruits engage in chanting and singing with veteran members. They experience arousal for which they have few if any prior useful interpretations. Instructions for response to the arousal are immediately supplied by veteran members who have staged and directed the collective incidents (cf. see Peven 1968). Novices quickly acquire interpretations of “religious ecstasy.” This process appears similar to how the more complex religious “glossolalia” behaviors are learned (Samarin 1969, 1970, 1973; but also see Goodman 1969).

Sports Events

Bogardus (1931) pioneered the study of spectator behaviors. His analysis of galleries at professional golf tournaments calls attention to nonverbal and verbal milling behaviors of spectators, shifts in focus of orientation, alternating “hushes,” and roars of approval or moans of disappointment following shots. Marsh and colleagues (1978) have reported the behaviors of British soccer
spectators, providing detailed descriptions of the division of labor and social organization of behaviors among young male partisans "on the terraces." Equally insightful are Marsh’s (1976) analyses of the “careers” through which young partisans pass in this highly conventionalized form of spectator behavior (cf. T. Smith 1968) as well as the highly stylized, symbolic aggression — “aggro” — between supporters of rival teams (Marsh 1975, 1978). Snow and colleagues (1981) describe a series of sports victory celebrations in the streets of a university community.

THE ILLUSION OF UNANIMITY McPhail & Pickens’s (1981) analysis of a videotape record of spectators at a state high-school championship basketball game establishes a pattern of temporal and spatial variation in individual and collective behaviors. The authors observed few instances of mutually inclusive collective behavior (e.g. common direction of focus occurred only 3% of the time). An inverse relationship was established between the number of people simultaneously engaged in several forms of collective response and the frequency with which such responses occurred.

EMOTION The several studies of religious rallies and a number of studies of sports spectators challenge Lofland’s recent (1981) contention that emotion has been slighted by contemporary students of collective behavior. More research may have been done on this than on any other behavioral phenomenon within demonstrations. (For a study of emotion display in gatherings, see Levy and Fenley 1979.)

Vocalization and applause Gambrell (1979) reports that collective vocalization and applause among stock-car racing spectators varies by the type of task activity (e.g. pre-race announcements, competition, delays to clear track) and consumes a fraction of the total time spectators are assembled. When vocalization or applause occur, they are neither mutually inclusive or continuous. Zillman and colleagues’ (1979) study of college football spectators provides systematic evidence for the common belief that fans cheer the success and bemoan the failure of their own team’s performances and behave conversely toward opponents.

Spectator effects on performers Schwartz & Barsky (1977) document the existence of “home crowd advantage.” It is greatest for collegiate basketball teams (75% home games won), then professional hockey teams (64%), collegiate (60%) and professional (58%) football teams, and lowest for professional baseball teams (53%). “Home crowd advantage” is greater for offensive than
for defensive play; against weaker teams; and when the home crowd is larger. Thirer & Rampey (1979) present evidence that college basketball teams commit more fouls during periods when their fans engage in higher rates of abusive and antisocial vocal behaviors.

**Performer effects on spectators**  One traditional hypothesis holds that spectatorship is vicarious participation and provides catharsis for pent up hostilities. Geen & Quanty’s (1977) review of the experimental literature provides no evidence for the catharsis hypothesis. To the contrary (Quanty 1976), the observation of aggressive behaviors generally increases hostility if not aggression by the observer.

Leuck and colleagues (1979) report higher levels of spectator verbalized hostility after than before observing a collegiate basketball game. Goldstein & Arms (1971) report that pre- to post-game increases in verbalized hostility were greater for observers of a football game than for observers of gymnastics competition. E. T. Turner (1970) reports that such increases were greater for observers of football and basketball games than for observers of wrestling matches. Arms, Russell & Sandilands (1979) report that the increases were greater for observers of hockey and wrestling than for observers of swimming competitions. Russell (1981) measured verbalized hostility before, during the first and second periods, and after one hockey game that was particularly violent and one that was relatively nonviolent. Increases in levels of spectator verbalized hostility corresponded to the level of violence in the former but not the latter game (cf. Harrell 1981).

**VIOLENCE** Does observed aggression beget spectator aggression? M. Smith (1978) examined ten years of a national Canadian newspaper and located 68 incidents of sport-related violence between 1963 and 1973. Three fourths of the incidents of collective spectator violence, as well as spectator outbursts stopping short of violence, were preceded by player violence. The general impression drawn from newspaper reports of US sporting events (Lewis 1982b) is that, excepting occasional fights, collective fan violence is comparatively rare. Scant observational data are consistent (cf. Dewar 1974).

Considerable media attention has been given, and two governmental commissions have examined, British football spectator violence. Marsh (1978) contends that most problematic behaviors outside and inside football arenas are symbolic aggression — “aggro” — rather than physical violence. This is confirmed by Trivizas’s (1980) comparison of persons arrested for offenses accompanying 1974–1976 football competitions in London and a matched sample of persons arrested in the same period and geographical area independent of football competitions.
BEHAVIORS WITHIN RIOTS

*Individual Participation*

It is difficult to observe a riot in progress, study film records, or read eyewitness accounts without concluding that riot participation does not consist exclusively of violence against property and person. More often it seems a mix of individual and collective behaviors, predominantly nonviolent (and much of that routine) but some violent behaviors as well. Regretably, researchers have not yet generated systematic observation records or participant reports against which to check this impression.

McPhail’s (1971) secondary analysis of data from ten studies of five riots established the extent of association between five measures of participation and 24 categories of individual attitudes and attributes. Overall, one third were not significant, 61% were of low magnitude (under .29), 6% were moderate (.30–.59), and fewer than 1% were high. Further, the deprivation-frustration-aggression (DFA) hypothesis received similar scant support when 173 personal attributes and attitudes bearing on that hypothesis were examined in relation to the various measures of riot participation. In sum, individual attitudes and attributes have not enabled the prediction of riot participation, but neither has the latter been well specified or adequately described.

*Riot Events*

**TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL VARIATION** Although initial studies merely differentiated riot from nonriot cities, the NACCD (1968) documented temporal variation in riot event activities. Most begin on weekday evenings or weekends, peak during late evening hours, decline to virtual inactivity from early morning to noon, then gradually increase again (cf. Fogelson & Hill 1968; Burbeck et al. 1978).

Raine and associates examined extensive police and fire department records, riot commission chronologies, and continuous television film records of the 1965 Watts riot. They constructed time-space distributions (time of day by census tract location) of 1850 incidents of crowds, rock throwing, looting, fires, and false alarms (see Abudu, Raine, Burbeck & Davison 1972 and Stark et al. 1974 for details; but see Stallings 1976).

Burbeck, Raine & Stark (1978) plotted the occurrence of various riot activities (e.g. looting, fires, false alarms, etc) by time of day for the 1964 Watts as well as the 1967 Detroit and the 1968 Washington riots. Peak riot activities occurred between 10 p.m. and midnight, thereafter dropping to negligible amounts until noon, and then gradually building up through the late afternoon and early evening. Evidence is presented for a behavior epidemic.
model that assumes riot development is a function of the number of unmobilized potential participants remaining to be contacted by initial participants who drop out of the riot and then proselytize others with accounts of available goods and absent or helpless police.

Stark, Raine, Burbeck & Davidson (1974) examined census tract location of looting and fires during the Watts riot. When any riot activity occurred in a new census tract, it was not a contiguous tract 79% of the time. This casts doubt on the simple contagion hypothesis—i.e. diffusion of rioting from a single point of origin. Over a five-day period of rioting, the earlier a census tract experienced riot activity, the more likely it was to have rioting on subsequent days, and the more frequently those activities were likely to occur. The investigators construe this as evidence for multiple riots within the larger time-space frame conventionally designated as “the” riot.

VARIATION IN SEVERITY Wanderer (1968, 1969) established an ordinal scale for severity of 75 US riots in 1967 including: vandalism; interfering with firemen; looting; state police participation; national guard participation; and death of a civilian or law officer. This approach (cf. Ford & Moore 1970; Adams 1972) was criticized (Spilerman 1976) for including control-agent response as an indicator of severity. Many communities, by virtue of location or size, have no mutual assistance pacts with neighboring police departments. Even a small riot requires them to seek assistance from state police or militia. Moreover, control-agent response can contribute to riot escalation (or suppression), thereby confounding dependent and independent variables.

Downes (1968; 1970) excluded control-agent response and generated a scale including no violence; low intensity (rock and bottle throwing, window breaking, fighting); medium intensity (the above plus some looting and arson); high intensity (the above plus widespread looting and arson); very high intensity (the above plus widespread looting, arson, and sniping). He reports a low correlation \( r = .15 \) between riot severity and size of the nonwhite population in 149 US cities with populations of 25,000 or more.

Spilerman (1976) added crowd size, number of arrests, and number of injuries to Downes’s items and produced an interval scale of riot severity. Examining socioeconomic-political characteristics of 322 US cities over 25,000 population, he found no relationships between absolute or relative deprivation and riot severity. The sole predictor was size of nonwhite population in northern cities (unstandardized regression coefficient = .89).

LOOTING Quarantelli & Dynes (1970) report looting in over 124 riots in US cities between 1964 and 1969. Based on comparisons with their extensive research on disaster looting, Quarantelli & Dynes (1968; Dynes & Quarantelli 1968) conclude riot looting is widespread, public, and involves community
residents; it is carried out in friendship or family groups; it is very selective of targets and frequently receives social support from neighbors.

Berk & Aldrich (1972) report studies of five 1967 and three 1968 riot cities. Stores with more expensive merchandise were more likely looted, supporting an “attractive target” hypothesis. A “familiarity” hypothesis was supported by evidence that stores frequented by blacks were more likely attacked. There was less support for a “retaliation” hypothesis—i.e. looting of merchants with negative attitudes toward civil rights or those not providing customer services. Even so, these factors accounted for only 25% of the variance in looting.

SNIPING Janowitz (1968) argued that civilians’ shooting at police was the distinctive characteristic of US riots in the 1960s. Masotti & Corsi (1969) argued that black nationalists’ shooting at police in the 1968 Cleveland riot represented a new pattern of riot behavior. Others’ research (Kerner 1968; Knopf 1969a) questioned both characterizations.

The Kerner (1968) profile of the 1967 Detroit riot portrays the not-uncommon confusion of local police about the source and extent of civilian sniper fire, coupled with police readiness to return fire. When federal troops arrived, their assessment of and actions in the situation established that most of the “sniping” involved the municipal or state police forces (or militia) shooting at each other.

Knopf (1969a) investigated sniper fire during riots in July and August of 1968. She found no evidence of conspiracy among snipers or of significant changes in the general pattern of encompassing riot behaviors. No police were killed in 23 of 25 incidents. In nearly half the incidents, police refuted press claims that sniping had occurred. In sum, the extent of sniping appears to be less, and its character different, than previously suggested by the mass media and some social scientists.

SOCIAL CONTROL Civilian social control efforts developed in 18 of 24 disorders examined by Kerner (1968). The typical counterrioter was characterized as an active supporter of existing social institutions. Anderson and associates (1974) suggest additional and varied interests were often at work. Field interviews in six riot cities suggest that some counterrioters (e.g. ministers) acted because of moral responsibilities and some (e.g. city employees) as an extension of their jobs. Others (e.g. youth gang leaders) sought personal or collective advantage within the community in consequence of their counterrioting. Some black activists sought to build a political base for post-riot organizing efforts.

Knopf (1969b) investigated “youth patrols” in a dozen 1967 and 1968 riots of varying intensity. In half the riots, patrols were present in the early stages; in the remainder, the patrols appeared after the violence had peaked. Still, Knopf contends that patrol presence coincided with the reduction or disappearance of
violence in 9 of 12 riots; effectively dispersed gatherings and reduced tensions in the majority of riots; and usually drew praise from community authorities (but cf. Marx & Archer 1971).

Another form of counterrioting noted by Kerner (1968) was the rumor control center. Knopf (1975) investigated centers in 97 cities. All were designed to investigate rumors—i.e. to gather and disseminate accurate information about the riot. They appear to have served the larger white community more than the blacks living in riot areas. Most telephone calls to the centers came from suburban whites inquiring about rumors that the riots were moving in their direction (cf. Ponting 1973).

Some civilian counterrioting was not an organized group effort. Warren (1969) reports that 1967 counterrioting activities in Detroit were highest in areas where his pre-riot interviews had documented positive identification with the neighborhood, interaction with neighbors, membership in local organizations, and participation in political activities of the larger community. Conversely, rioting was highest in neighborhoods with minimal identification, interaction, memberships, and/or political participation. Kapsis (1976) reported a similar relationship between racial stability and social integration of neighborhoods and the speed with which vandalism and other riot behaviors ended during the 1968 riots in Richmond (Oakland), California.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

We have heeded Marx & Wood’s (1975) categorical imperatives by reviewing empirical research on observed behaviors in “actual crowd situations.” We have gone beyond traditional myopic concerns with “the acting, aggressive and ideological crowd” by reviewing and reporting the results of various research strategies on a variety of individual and collective behaviors within gatherings, demonstrations, and riots. We conclude by noting patterns in the research and problems that warrant further attention.

First, there is growing evidence that during gatherings, demonstrations, and riots most individuals assemble and remain with friends, family, or acquaintances. Those social units constitute sources of instructions and sanctions for the individual’s behavior. We must learn what participants do; when, where, and with whom they do it; and at whose suggestion and with what sanctions they behave as they do.

Second, the size of gatherings and demonstrations, often debated among organizers, their opponents, and social control agents, can now be systematically and reliably estimated.

Third, increasing recognition of “the illusion of unanimity” has resulted in attention to variations in, and alternation between, individual and collective behaviors within gatherings, demonstrations, and riots. Some elementary
forms of collective behavior are repeatedly observed across a variety of gatherings, demonstrations, and some riots—e.g. milling, collective focus, queueing, collective locomotion, and collective vocalization and applause.

Fourth, if these elementary forms can be extemporaneously cued within gatherings by a handful of persons acting in concert, social-movement organizations can accomplish more by design. The more complex the concerted behavior in question, and the more people involved, the more pre-event planning, organization, and rehearsal and the more direction and supervision within the event appear to be required.

Fifth, emotion is displayed in many forms (e.g. laughter, cheers, applause) and has been examined in various settings. Sports spectators consistently express more hostility after than before observing aggressive performances. While there is minimal evidence for the catharsis hypothesis, neither is there evidence that merely observing violence is sufficient to produce violent behavior by the observer.

Sixth, research to date requires revising traditional characterization of “collective” violence. It is infrequent in gatherings, in political rallies, and at sports events; it is neither mutually inclusive nor continuous in riots. Neither system nor individual characteristics have predicted violence in those events. Scholars are beginning to give attention to how such events are formed, and to the interaction of participants, as sources of violence within events.

Seventh, aggregate measures of riot behaviors establish that riots vary in severity and in the temporal and spatial distribution of vandalism, looting, and arson. Aggregate measures contribute to our knowledge of general patterns. Regretably, individual riot participation has not been equally well specified or described, nor has it been predicted by means of a wide range of individual attributes and attitudes. We are not likely to predict or explain riot participation until we can first specify what is to be explained.

Eighth, our knowledge of social control is limited. The interaction of civilians and police in routine gatherings is typically controlled by the latter’s firm and repeated talk and seldom by resort to physical coercion. Disorderly policing of demonstrations in the 1960s led to criticism and revision of police policy and sometimes practice. There has been less research on civilian control of demonstrations and on police-civilian interaction there. We need to know the types of demonstrator behaviors that occasion police intervention, the types of intervention that occasion further demonstrator resistance, the types of resistance that occasion police escalation of force, and the role of demonstration marshalls and police in controlling these developments.

Finally, while we know far more today than 15 years ago about behaviors within gatherings, demonstrations, and riots, much of what we know is that traditional characterizations are inaccurate and traditional explanations will no longer suffice. Nonetheless, we have begun to develop our knowledge of
behaviors within these events. As that knowledge increases we will be in a better position to develop and test alternate theoretical formulations that correspond to the phenomena to be explained.

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